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INTRODUCTION
On the last day of the 2002 Term, the United States Supreme Court
quietly opened fire on state judicial elections. In Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White,' a sharply divided Court struck down a portion of the
Minnesota Code ofJudicial Conduct ("Minnesota Code" or"Code") that
prohibited a judicial candidate from "'announc[ing] his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues.'" In a majority opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, and in a strongly-worded concurring opinion by Justice
O'Connor, the Court denounced the practice of electing judges and suggested that the election of judges cannot be reconciled with a state's3
asserted interest in maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality.
The decision resulted in imminent changes to the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the judicial conduct codes of
several states.5 Lower courts have relied on the decision to relax restrictions on candidate speech in judicial elections. 6 Interest groups are
seeking to further abolish candidate speech restrictions in a number of
states. Moreover, some states have viewed the Court's decision in White
as a call to abandon judicial elections in favor ofjudicial appointments.
This Article is directed at the ongoing discussion taking place in
many states and among members of the bench and bar about whether
states that elect judges should switch to appointment in light of hite. I
1.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).

2.

Id. at 770 (quoting

MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 5(a)(3)(d)(i)

(2004)).
3.
Id. at 787.
4.
See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Independence
and Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Recommendation to
the House of Delegates, adopted August 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/
judind/judicialethics/amendmentsrevision.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
5.
In one particularly alarming example, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
2003 made changes to that state's code of judicial conduct, which now permits judges to:
(1) "preside over, and speak at any political party gathering, meeting or other convocation,
including a fund-raising function for himself'; (2) "endorse any individual seeking election to any office or conduct a joint campaign with and endorse other individuals seeking
election to judicial office"; and (3) "personally solicit campaign funds and request public
support from anyone for his own campaign." N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(B)(1), (2), (4) (2003). The changes in North Carolina's Code seem particularly unwarranted because North Carolina did not even have the equivalent of an "Announce Clause"
at the time of the Mhite decision. See infra Part I.A.
6.
See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking down on
First Amendment grounds a section of the Georgia Code ofJudicial Conduct that prohibited judicial candidates from negligently misrepresenting the record of opposing
candidates, and holding that only actual malice may be prohibited by the Code).
7.
Emily Heller, Judicial Races Get Meaner, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1098217045311 (reporting multistate
litigation efforts by interest groups to strike down judicial candidate speech restrictions).
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argue that states should resist what I regard as the Court's heavy-handed
dicta denouncing judicial elections in White. Rather than accede to the
pressure to shift from an elective to an appointive system-pressure that I
understand is being felt in several states-I contend that states should regard the White decision as an opportunity to engage in a thorough and
far-reaching review of judicial selection. Before presuming that judicial
elections ipso facto cannot be reconciled with the ideal of judges as independent, impartial decision-makers, states should seek ways to improve
their methods of judicial selection in order to improve judicial decisionmaking. States with judicial elections should be prepared to drastically
transform the way judges are elected to address what I concede are significant failings in most judicial election systems. Principal among these
deficiencies, in my view, is the failure of judicial elections to adequately
address the lack of racial diversity on the nation's courts.
Indeed, in this Article I take the explicit and unapologetic view that
the diversity question is a central one to resolving the controversy surrounding whether to elect or appoint judges. I adopt this stance for four
reasons. First, as I have argued in earlier articles, the interaction of diverse
viewpoints and perspectives is essential to impartial, legitimate, and fully
informed judicial decision-making. 8 As such, I have argued that racial diversity is an essential ingredient for the judiciary to guarantee both
structural and individual impartiality. I continue to press that case here.
Second, conversations among reform-minded, good-government,
and bar groups about whether or how to elect judges generally do not
include diversity as a central issue. Instead, the question of how electing or
appointing judges may affect racial diversity on the bench is often an
"add-on" issue. It is my contention that states taking up proposals to shift
from electing to appointing judges are giving insufficient attention to the
matter of diversity.
Third, shifting from electing to appointing judges in many southern
jurisdictions will remove oversight ofjudicial selection from coverage under the Voting Rights Act. 9 Currently, states and jurisdictions covered by
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act need preclearance from the Justice
10
Department before they may shift from electing to appointing judges.
Preclearance is denied when the Justice Department determines that
switching from election to appointment would diminish the ability of
minority voters to participate equally in the selection of candidates of
See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill,Judging the judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Repre8.
sentation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. Ra. 95 (1997) [hereinafter Ifill,Judging thejudges];
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405 (2000) [hereinafter Ifill, Beyond Role Models].
9.
Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982) (setting out the required process of administrative
10.
or judicial preclearance for so-called "covered" jurisdictions seeking to make changes to
voting practices or procedures).
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their choice to the bench. For this reason, how the shift from an elective
to an appointive system will affect diversity on the bench must be grappled with in jurisdictions covered by Section 4.
Fourth, I direct attention to the diversity question because I find
that the lens of diversity necessarily focuses the analysis on several key
issues that bear on the question of how best to select judges. These issues
include defining what "impartiality" means in the context of judging, addressing head-on how or whether judges can be "representatives'" and
exploring whether and how elected or appointed judges can be "accountable" to the public. It is the failure of states and the bar, including the
ABA, to adequately address these questions that permitted the Court in
Mhite to articulate and impose its own conception of the judicial function
on states.
In Part I of this Article, I review the issues raised in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, looking both at the specific controversy in that case
and at the broader controversy surrounding candidate speech in state judicial elections. I focus particularly on Justice Scalia's attempt to define
judicial impartiality in White. I regard his conception of impartiality in the
context of judging as unnecessarily cramped and rigid. I further contend
that Justice Scalia's definition of judicial impartiality undermines the
Court's long-held view that the appearance as well as the fact of bias may
violate the Due Process Clause." I focus as well on Justice O'Connor's
harsh denunciation of judicial elections in White. Her concurring opinion, in both tone and substance, signals a sea change in the Court's
traditional deference to states in regulating how judges are selected and
how judicial elections are conducted.
In Part II of this Article, I question why the Court uses hite to
take such a hard and overreaching position against judicial elections. I
contend that White does not line up squarely with the Court's earlier jurisprudence reviewing judicial elections, nor is it consistent with the
Court's more recent instances of deference to state or congressional interest in promoting the appearance of legitimacy for political leaders and
representatives. I begin by framing White within the context of a trio of
cases related to judicial selection decided by the Court in the early 1990s.
In those cases, the Court-including both Justices Scalia and
O'Connor-although articulating a preference for the appointment of
judges, nevertheless gave a strong measure of deference to the decisions of
states to elect their judges. The Court recognized that even when judges
are elected, the judicial function remains distinct in important ways from
that of other elected officers. Next, moving to the Court's more recent
11.
I have argued that members of the Supreme Court, including Justice Scalia, have
failed to properly apply the "appearance of impartiality" standard in their own recusal
practice. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Do Appearances Matter?:Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. Rav. 606 (2002) [hereinafter Ifill, Do Appearances
Matter?];Sherrilyn A. 1fill,
Can He Be Recused?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 60.
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jurisprudence, I note that Justice O'Connor's stance in White is at odds
with her position in two other high-profile cases involving First Amendment issues-Grutter v. Bollinger2 and McConnell v. Federal Elections
Commission. 3
Ultimately I conclude that the Court's newly vehement and open
hostility to judicial elections coincides with the political challenges to the
impartiality of federal judges and judicial nominees that have emerged
over the past decade. In essence, I detect in the Court's aggressive stance
against state judicial elections a deeply self-conscious concern with maintaining the ideal of judicial impartiality-an ideal that the Court regards
as embodied in the distinct-qualities of the appointed federal judiciary.
In Part III, I press the case that given the Court's per se and perhaps
self-conscious hostility toward judicial elections, states should resist the
Court's coercive attempt to impose judicial appointments. Instead, while
states and the bar should use White as an opportunity to examine and reform deeply flawed judicial election systems, they should resist the lure of
appointing judges as a panacea. I caution states to examine closely how
switching to appointing judges might negatively affect racial diversity on
the bench.
I conclude by proposing several initiatives that I contend will greatly
advance the reformation of judicial election systems in ways that will
promote both impartiality and diversity on the bench. These initiatives
are: (1) defining impartiality in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and
state codes with an emphasis on the appearance of impartiality and the
importance of structural impartiality as due process concerns; (2) public
financing of judicial elections; (3) exploring the use of cumulative voting
for the election of judges; and (4) creating a partnership between the
bench, the bar, and public policy groups to develop an education campaign about the judicial function. The last proposal would involve an
ongoing program designed to educate voters about the judicial function
as well as mandatory and regularized educational programs for judges
about the meaning of impartiality.
I1ThE ANNOUNCE CLAUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
REPUB ICAN PARTY OF MNNESOTA

V WHITE

A. The Announce Clause
The Announce Clause in the Minnesota Code ofJudicial Conduct
prohibited "a candidate for judicial office, including an incumbent judge'
from "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political

12.
13.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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issues." ' 4 Minnesota's Lawyer Professional Responsibility Board ("Board")
had primary responsibility for addressing alleged violations of the Code.
Although the Code contemplated that the Board could impose sanctions
for violations of the Announce Clause, including censure, civil penalties,
disbarment, or removal for incumbent judges, there was no evidence that
the Board ever imposed these penalties on a judicial candidate or judge
for violations of the Announce Clause.'" Gregory Wersal, the candidate at
issue in White, sought an advisory opinion from the Board regarding
statements he wished to make during a campaign for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Board refused to issue the opinion on the
ground that Wersal had already filed suit against the Minnesota Board of
Judicial Standards challenging its ability to enforce the Announce
Clause. 16 The state's Republican Party joined Wersal's suit against the
Board of Judicial Standards and argued that the Announce Clause prevented party members from learning Wersal's views on important issues.
The Minnesota Announce Clause was promulgated in 1974 and
modeled on a similar provision of the 1972 American Bar Association
Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("ABA Model Code").' 8 Although the
1990 ABA Model Code does not contain an Announce Clause, Minnesota continued to use an Announce Clause modeled on the earlier ABA
provision.
Both the 1990 ABA Model Code and the Minnesota Code include
another important clause that reinforces the rationale behind the Announce Clause. This provision, sometimes called the Pledges and Promises
Clause or the Commit Clause,' 9 prohibits a candidate from making
"'pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of office.' 20 Together the Announce and
the Pledges and Promises Clauses in the Minnesota Code were designed
to restrain judicial aspirants from making statements that would undermine both the reality and the appearance of impartiality on the state
bench. A majority of the states that elect judges have adopted either an
14.
MINN. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2004).
15.
White, 536 U.S. at 799 n.2 (StevensJ., dissenting).
16.
Id. at 769 n.2. The Minnesota Board of judicial Standards, along with the Lawyers' Board, "enforces the ethical rules applicable to judges." Id. at 770 n.3.
17.
Id. at 770.
18.
The ABA removed the Announce Clause from the 1990 Model Code ofJudicial
Conduct, allegedly because of concerns that the Clause was vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge. See id. at 773 n.5.
19.
In the ABA Model Code, the so-called "Commit Clause" prevents candidates
from, "with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court[, making] pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial

performance of the adjudicative duties of office." ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2003).
20.
Mhite, 536 U.S. at 770 (citing MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon

5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2004)).
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Announce Clause or a Pledges and Promises Clause,2 reflecting a strong
and prevailing interest among states in imposing some restrictions on candidate speech in judicial elections to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the bench.
The importance of impartiality to the legitimacy of the judiciary
cannot be overstated.22 The right to an impartial tribunal is guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.22 The Supreme Court
has held that even the appearance of bias may violate the due process
rights of litigants. 2 As the Court eloquently stated fifty years ago, "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.' '2' Federal and state recusal statutes
provide that litigants may seek the recusal of a judge from a case in which
it appears that her impartiality might "reasonably be questioned. '26 Thus
the Announce Clause and other restrictions on judicial candidate speech
can be understood as part of an effort by states in which judges are
elected to ensure that the impartiality of the bench-in both fact and appearance-is not compromised by the conduct ofjudicial aspirants on the
campaign trail.
B.Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority,Justice Scalia ruled in White that the Minnesota Announce Clause violates the First Amendment rights of judicial
candidates. 7 The Court held that the Announce Clause is not narrowly
tailored to serve the State's articulated interest in preserving the impartiality of the bench. In fact,Justice Scalia found
2 that the Announce Clause "is
barely tailored to serve that interest at all." 1
The substance of the opinion turns on Justice Scalia's definition of
impartiality and his conclusion that the Minnesota Announce Clause cannot be justified by the State's articulated interest in impartiality. At the
outset, Justice Scalia noted an important and startling fact: despite the use
of the term impartiality throughout the Eighth Circuit's White opinion,
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, and the American Bar Association's Code ofJudicial Conduct, "none of these sources bothers to define
21.
Id. at 786.
22.
See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in JudicialEthics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1059, 1084 (1996) ("The association between impartiality and due
process is as old as the judicial system itself.").
23.
SeeTumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,522-23, 531 (1927).
24.
See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
25.
Id.
26.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
27.
The Court was careful to "express no view" on the Pledges and Promises or
Commit Clause, which was not challenged by the Republican Party. Republican Party of
Minn. v.White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002).
28.
Id. at 776.
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it." ' Thus Justice Scalia undertook the task of defining impartiality with a
more or less blank slate.30
Justice Scala proffered three possible definitions of judicial impartiality. First, he determined that impartiality may be defined as a "lack of
bias for or against either party to the proceeding., 3 1 But according to Justice Scalia, the Minnesota Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to
serve this definition of impartiality.32 The Announce Clause, reasoned Justice Scalia, restricts speech "for or against particular issues" rather than for
or against parties.3 3 The Clause, therefore, could not be tailored to address
bias for or against parties.34
The second definition of judicial impartiality recognized by Justice
Scalia is a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal
view." Justice Scalia found that promoting this kind of impartiality is not
a compelling state interest. According to Justice Scalia, such an interest
cannot be compelling because "[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding
the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice.' 36 This contention is debatable. The confirmation
process for federal judges and Supreme Court Justices in particular regularly centers on whether a nominee has staked out a position on a variety
of legal issues. Arguably, at least part of the motivation for this line of inquiry is to determine whether the nominee, if confirmed, would be able
to impartially decide cases raising certain legal issues. Justice Scalia himself
declined to answer such questions about whether he would vote to overrule a particular case at his own confirmation hearing, stating," 'I think it
is quite a thing to be arguing to somebody who you know has made a
representation in the course of his confirmation hearings .... I would be
in a very bad position to adjudicate the case without being accused of

29.
Id. at 775. This important point shows the failure of the state code and the ABA
Model Code to define perhaps the most central element of a legitimate judiciary. It speaks

volumes about the impoverished nature of the ongoing discussion about judicial elections
and impartiality at the state and national bar levels.

30.

Id. at 775-78 (identifying three possible ways to define judicial impartiality, with

Justice Scalia using Webster's New International Dictionary and his own sense of how this

term can
31.
32.
33.
34.

plausibly be defined as his sources).
Id. at 775 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 776.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Justice Scalia apparently saw no potential connection between issues about

which a judicial candidate might express his views and classes of parties like civil rights
plaintiffs or criminal defendants who routinely raise those very issues in litigation. These

classes might appear before an elected judge who had previously announced his views as a
"pro-death penalty" or "anti-affirmative action" candidate.
35.
White, 536 U.S. at 777 (emphasis omitted in part).
36.
Id.
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having a less than impartial view of the matter.'"' In essence, Justice
Scalia found his interest in maintaining judicial impartiality sufficiently
compelling to refrain from making representations at his confirmation
hearing--the federal judicial equivalent of a state judge's campaign-but
refused to credit that interest when it was articulated by the state of Minnesota.
The final definition of impartiality identified by Justice Scalia is
"openmindedness." 38Justice Scalia did not expound on the merits of this
form of impartiality for the simple reason that he found that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not adopt the Announce Clause to further this
form of impartiality. 39
As Justice Ginsburg discussed in her dissent, 40 Justice Scalia's analysis
of judicial impartiality is deficient in a number of ways. First, it fails to
account for ways that judges may be biased against classes of parties rather
than just individual litigants.4 For example, a judge who, on the campaign
trail, says, "I don't believe that every time someone gets injured by a
product, she should sue a manufacturer for millions of dollars," expresses a
bias against products liability plaintiffs rather than against a particular
named party. A plaintiff suing a manufacturer for an injury in a product
liability suit whose case is assigned to this judge has reason to believe that
this judge will not hear her case impartially.
The potential connection between a judge's stated views on a disputed issue and his bias for or against a particular party is exemplified
ironically by Justice Scalia's own decision in 2004 to recuse himself from
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 42 a case involving a challenge
to a compulsory, school-led pledge of allegiance. In the year prior to the
case's arrival at the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia had publicly denounced
challenges to the compulsory pledge of allegiance in schools.43 When
Newdow made its way to the High Court months later, Justice Scalia
37.

Id. at 818 n.4 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (quoting 13 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,

1916-1986, at 131

(Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1989)) (hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the nomination of then-Judge Scalia).
38.
Id. at 778.
39.
Id. It is interesting that Justice Scalia gave "openmindedness"-the definition of
impartiality that embodies the highest aspirational role for judges-the least consideration.
I regard this as a blessing in disguise in that it leaves the bar and states open to embrace
"openmindedness" as a key component of impartiality without the taint of what would
likely have been Justice Scalia's cynical and cramped conception of this ideal.
40.
Id. at 814-16 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
41.
For example, a judge might be ideologically biased against civil rights plaintiffs
or criminal defendants.
42.
124 S.Ct. 2301 (2004).
43.
See Charles Lane, High Court To Consider Pledge in Schools; Scalia Recuses Himself
From California Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at A-1.
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wisely decided to recuse himself from hearing the case. If Justice Scalia
had been running in a judicial election in Minnesota, the Minnesota Announce Clause would have prevented him from announcing his views
about pledge of allegiance cases on the campaign trail.
The obvious rejoinder is that the Minnesota Announce Clause is
not narrowly tailored to address this circumstance because a less restrictive
alternative-recusal-exists to address the potential conflict. Indeed it is
possible that in such a case a judge might recuse himself just as Justice
Scalia voluntarily withdrew from hearing Newdow. But this argument differs from that offered by Justice Scalia in White, which ignores the
connection between speech for or against particular issues and speech for
or against particular parties.
Second, Justice Scalia's definition of impartiality reads the importance of the appearance of impartiality out of the due process impartial
judge mandate.44 Although he did not expressly contradict the Supreme
Court's 1954 admonition that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice," 4' his failure to recognize perception as a critical part of impartiality
suggests that he gave it little weight.46 This is particularly striking because
the State of Minnesota specifically identified "preserving the appearance
of the impartiality of the state judiciary" as one of the interests the Announce Clause was designed to serve."
Justice Scalia's opinion is also remarkable for its apparent ignorance
of and disregard for the on-the-ground reality of state judicial elections.
In rejecting the argument that the Announce Clause serves the State's
interest in preserving the openmindedness of judges, Justice Scalia
reasoned that because "statements in election campaigns are ...an infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges
(or judges-to-be) undertake ... [that] object of the [Announce Clause]
prohibition is just implausible.,1 8 As examples, he cited the participation of
Supreme Court Justice Black in cases construing the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which he had helped to write, and "ChiefJustice Hughes' authorship
of the opinion overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital in 1923" when he
had previously criticized the case in a book.49
Justice Scalia's reliance on the experiences of federal judges-indeed
Supreme Court Justices-to support his argument regarding state judges
speaks volumes. Justice Scalia seems blissfully unaware of the openly partisan and contentious nature of many state judicial elections. The use of
44.
See White, 536 U.S at 817-18 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
45.
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
46.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to develop meaningful and uniform standards for deciding "appearance" questions in the context of recusal, see IfiU, Do
Appearances Matter?, supra note 11, at 606-51.
47.
White, 536 U.S. at 775 (citations omitted).
Id. at 779.
48.
49.
Id. (citations omitted).
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inflammatory slogans and tag lines by judicial candidates and groups that
support or oppose them characterizes most contested judicial races. A
2002 study of state supreme court elections found that in most election
contests, the judicial candidates who aired the greatest number of television ads won their elections and that:
only 36% of Supreme Court candidate advertisements focused
on the traditional theme of candidate qualifications. Instead,
most candidate ads invoked hot-button issues like crime, health
care, tort liability, and special interest influence. And the candidates' carefully scripted language made it clear that the era of
stressing qualifications, already under siege, appears to be on its
50
way out.
Likewise, when Justice Scalia suggested in White that judges often
have already announced their views on disputed legal issues "in classes
that they conduct, and in books and speeches" 5' he seemed woefully unaware that most state court judges-particularly at the trial court levelare not drawn from the ranks of law professors and authors but are more
likely to be former trial lawyers or prosecutors.
Moreover, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, Justice Scalia
"largely ignores the fact that judicial elections are not limited to races for
the highest court in the State.,1 2 The dangers inherent when candidates
announce their views, according to Justice Stevens, may be particularly
great for state trial judges, who decide cases alone and whose decisions
regarding evidence, witnesses, and the conduct of trial receive great deference on appeal. But as Justice Stevens remarked, the majority opinion in
White "has a hypothetical quality to it."5 3 It perhaps reflects the myopia of
Supreme Court Justices, whose only judicial experiences are within the
rarefied world of the federal judiciary and who are nevertheless stubbornly unwilling to defer to the state's determination of how candidate
announcements may threaten judicial impartiality in state judicial elections.

50.

See

DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,

THE NEw POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002, at 11 (Bert Brandenburg ed., 2002),

available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=3,415. Declaring himself "the only endorsed pro-life candidate,' for example, helped challenger Pobert
R. Thomas unseat an incumbent Illinois Supreme Court justice in 2000. William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Erafor State Courts, N.YTtMEs,June 5, 2000, at Al.
51.
White, 536 U.S. at 779.
52.
Id. at799 n.2 (Stevens,J., dissenting).

53.

Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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C.Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Because Justice O'Connor was once an elected state court judge,
and because her opinion in White was so harshly derisive ofjudicial elections, her concurrence warrants particular attention. From the first line of
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor was candid about the reasons for
writing her three-page dicta: "I ... write separately to express my concerns about judicial elections generally. 5 4 Her opinion said little about the
Announce Clause but focused instead on what she saw as the folly of
states that continue to use contested elections for judges-a practice that
she deemed to be at odds with judicial impartiality. In Justice O'Connor's
view, "[ellected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not
satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelecnever explained why this is a pressure
tion prospects.'"' Justice O'Connor
6
felt only by elected judges.5
A significant portion of Justice O'Connor's concurrence was devoted to extolling the virtues of the Missouri Plan for selecting judges.5 '
Under this system, which has been adopted by fifteen states, judges are
selected first by an executive from a list provided by a nominating commission. Thereafter, judges run in periodic retention elections. Justice
O'Connor found this far superior to contested elections because "[t]his
system obviously reduces threats to judicial impartiality."'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence ended as bluntly as it began. She
concluded with a shockingly facile summation of the problem the State
of Minnesota faces in White: "[11f the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing
the practice of popularly electing judges.""0
II.TiE COURT'S EMERGING HOSTILITY TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Justice Scalia's opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence started a
flurry of debate among judicial watch-dog groups, ethical experts, the
60
American Bar Association, and state supreme courts, even in states that
54.
55.
56.
pellate or

Id. at 788 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
Id. at 789 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
In fact, appointed judges who wish to be elevated someday to a seat on an apsupreme court likely feel similar pressure. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges

and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5
(1993) (acknowledging that aspiring to the Supreme Court may influence the decisionmaking of some federal appellate judges).
White, 536 U.S. at 791-92 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
57.
Id. at 791 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
58.
59.
Id. at 792 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
See, e.g., Terry Carter, Limit on judicial Speech Thrown Out, ABA E-JoUtNAL REP.,
60.
June 28, 2002 (reporting concern of the American Bar Association's president that the
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did not have the equivalent of an Announce Clause. Were states and the
ABA compelled to adopt Justice Scalia's definition of impartiality? Did
the overall thrust of the decision ultimately mean that electing judges is
truly incompatible with an impartial judiciary? Did the Court's opinion
effectively undermine elections as a legislative means of selecting judges
by removing virtually all meaningful barriers to candidate speech and inviting a disorderly free-for-all in judicial campaigns? 6' The impact of
White was heightened by the fact that at the time of the decision, judges
and public policy groups had grown increasingly concerned about the
negative tone of many judicial election contests and the rising power of
third-party interest groups in influencing the tenor and outcome of judi62
cial campaigns.
The meaning of White is perhaps best understood by examining the
decision within the context of the Court's rich jurisprudence in a remarkably illuminating line of earlier cases involving judicial election
issues. An examination of White in this context suggests that the decision
may reflect the Court's recent and increased sensitivity to the public's
overall skepticism about the impartiality of judges. In fact, White constitutes a marked departure from both the Court's approach to other cases
involving judicial elections, and the Court's recent stance in cases raising
First Amendment issues where the state or federal government's interest
in preserving the appearance of legitimacy for public leaders was at issue.
Read in the context of the Court's decisions in these cases, White should
be regarded quite cautiously by states and members of the bar who contemplate whether to abolish judicial elections.
A. The 1991 Judges Cases
During the 1991 Term, the Supreme Court faced three cases that
raised questions about the tension between judicial impartiality and the
White decision would "open a Pandora's Box"); Editorial, ElectedJudges: Ruling Helps Assure
Candidates Can Speak Their Minds, DETROIT FREE PREss, June 29, 2002, available at
http://wwwfreep.com/voices/editorials/ejud29_20020629.htm (quoting law professor
Steven Lubet describing judicial campaign commitments as "'bad, bad, bad"'); Lynn
Marks, Ruling Tears at Judiciary's Impartiality, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEws (Harrisburg, Pa.),July
14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3001623 (quoting Director of Pennsylvanians for Modern
Courts, who described the ruling as "deeply troubling").
61.
For example, North Carolina overhauled its Model Code ostensibly in response
to White, even though it had no Announce Clause in its Code. N.C. CODE Or JUDIcIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1),(2),(4) (2003).

62
Paul D. Carrington & Adam K. Long, The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 455 (2002); Anthony Champagne,
Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv. 669 (2002);John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9
N.YU. ENVTL. LJ. 217 (2001); see Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicial Elections, 2000:
Change and Challenge, 2001 L. R.Ev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849 (2001).
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method of or qualifications for judicial selection. In those cases involving
judicial selection decided more than a decade earlier, the Court appeared
to take a more measured view of judicial elections and a more deferential
position towards states' articulated interests in how judicial officers are
selected than the view expressed in White. In each of the 1991 cases, a
majority of the Court articulated two important themes: (1) states must
be accorded deference in their determinations of the qualifications and
means of selecting their judges; and (2) although judges share important
similarities with officials from the policymaking branches of government,
the judicial function differs fundamentally from that of elected representatives or executive officials.63
In the first case, Gregory v. Ashcroft,64 Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion 5 that upheld a lower court's determination that a state
law mandating a retirement age for judges was not in conflict with the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") because appointed
state judges are not "employees" as defined by the ADEA. 66
The Court found that in enacting the ADEA, Congress did not intend to intrude on the states' long-held authority to proscribe the
qualifications of office for their governmental officials.67 Indeed this authority, said Justice O'Connor, "lies at 'the heart of representative
government. ,,68
Not only does this state power survive statutes enacted
by Congress pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause, but the
Court further held that the power of states to "define the qualifications of
their officeholders has force even against the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment."69 So long as the proscription is rational, the Court
found that Congress cannot intrude upon this sovereign power reserved
to the states.70
Thus, the Court determined that Missouri's mandatory retirement
age of seventy for judges is a rational exercise of state authority.7 The
Court conceded, however, that Missouri's mandatory retirement age law
"is founded on a generalization about the mental ability of elderly

63.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1991); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400

(1991).
64.
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
65.
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Souter, and Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor. Yet
eleven years later, all but Justice Souter issued strongly-worded condemnations of judicial
elections and joined the majority in White. See Republican Parry of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765 (2002).
66.
Gregory v.Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598,598 (8th Cir. 1990).
67.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473.
68.
Id. at 463 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,647 (1973)).
69.
Id. at 468.
70.
Id. at 470.
71.
Id. at 472-73.
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judges. 72 At the time of the Gregory decision, four members of the Court
were themselves well over age seventy. 7 Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority stated that "[i]t is far from true that all judges suffer significant
deterioration in performance at age 70. It is probably not true that most
''74
do. It may not be true at all.
Nevertheless, the Court deferred to the
State's determination that judicial officers could be compelled to step
down after age seventy.
The Court even upheld the rationality of Missouri's retirement law
despite the fact that the law singled out judges-not legislators or executive officals-for retirement at age seventy without any evidence that
judges over age seventy are likely to be more incapable than other public
officers of performing their jobs. This kind of unequal targeting of a
group goes to the heart of whether a law has been enacted for a discriminatory purpose. 5 Yet the Court in Gregory deferred to the State's
unproven determination that "the threat of deterioration at age seventy is
sufficiently great" to justify the imposition of retirement on judges of a
76
certain age.
In addition, the Court in Gregory grappled-albeit in a limited fashion-with how to define the judicial function, cautiously approaching the
question of whether judges are policymakers. The key language in the
statute at issue in Gregory lay in the definition of "employee" under the
ADEA, which excluded from coverage under the Act "'appointee[s] on
the policymaking level.' ,7 Judges in Missouri are first appointed by the
Governor and then subjected to periodic retention elections. 78 The Supreme Court rejected the argument made by Missouri judges challenging
the state retirement law that judges are not policymakers. Quoting Justice
Holmes' view that the decisions of common law judges are "'traceable to
views of public policy in the last analysis,' ,7 the Court concluded that
72.
73.

Id. at 473.
In 1991 Justice Thurgood Marshall was 83, Justice Harry Blackmun was 83,

Justice William Brennan was 85, and Justice Byron White was 74. COMM'N
TENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,

BEcINNINGS AN D JUSTICES

THE

SuPREMv

ON THE

BICEN-

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS

1790-1991, at 276 (1992).

74.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473.
75.
See id. at 456.
76.
Id. at 473.
77.
Id. at 465 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(o (1990)).
78.
This so-called "Missouri Plan" for electing judges has often been lauded by
opponents of contested judicial elections as the best method for selecting judicial officers.
See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of
Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTrLE ROCK L.J. 281, 284 (1995); Norman

Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUnICA URE 128 (1990);
James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A /K/A Merit Selection: Is It the Best Solution for Selecting
MichiganJudges?, 75 MICH. B.J. 918 (1996).
79.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36
(1881)).
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"[ilt is at least ambiguous whether a state judge is an 'appointee on the

policymaking level." ,80 In sum, Gregory stands for the proposition that a
state's determination of the qualifications for its judicial officers is to be
accorded great deference and cannot, in the absence of specific congressional intent, be intruded upon by laws enacted pursuant to either the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. In addition, Gregory
signals the Court's willingness to recognize the policymaking dimension
of common law judging.
These two themes are present also in two companion cases from the
1991 Term, Chisom v. Roemer" and Houston Lawyers'Association v. Attorney
General of Texas."2 In both of these cases, the question at issue was whether
state judicial elections are subject to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 ("the Act")." Section 2 of the Act, as amended by Congress in 1982,
protects racial minority voters against election "practices and procedures
that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote" and the right
to participate in the political process. 4 Unlike voting challenges brought
under the Constitution, which require proof of intentional discrimination
to prove a violation, the Act is violated even in the absence of proof of
discriminatory intent."5 Thus the Voting Rights Act is a potent tool in the
hands of minority voters to eliminate both blatant and subtle forms of
electoral discrimination.
The Voting Rights Act protects the ability of minority groups to
elect representatives of their choice. Chisom involved elections for the
Louisiana Supreme Court, 6 while elections for Texas trial judges were the
focus of the litigation in Houston Lawyers'. 7 The distinction between the
application of the Voting Rights Act to appellate rather than trial court
elections had been an important one in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court from which both of these cases were appealed. Chisom and
Houston Lawyers', therefore, presented two issues: whether judges may
properly be conceived of as representatives whose elections are covered by
the Act, and in the case of Houston Lawyers', whether a single trial judge
can ever "represent" voters.
In majority opinions authored by Justice Stevens, the Court in Chisom and Houston Lawyers' upheld the application of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to both appellate and trial level elected judges. Like the ADEA
in Gregory, the question of coverage of the Act turned on the definitions
of key terms. But unlike in Gregory, the Court in Chisom and Houston
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 467.
501 U.S. 380 (1991).
501 U.S. 419 (1991).
Houston Lawyers', 501 U.S. at 421

84.
85.
86.
87.

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 383-84 & n.2.
See id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
501 U.S. at 421.
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Lawyers' found that the language of theVoting Rights Act covered judicial
elections. The Court held that unless Congress expressly excluded judges
from the strictures of the Voting Rights Act, the Court would not do so.
On the question of whether elected judges are representatives, 9 the
Court found that judges who are elected are representatives in the sense
contemplated by Congress when it amended the Voting Rights Act in
1982. The Court recognized the "tension between the ideal character of
the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics"9° and suggested
that the federal model of appointed judges with life tenure best promotes
the creation of an impartial judiciary.1 The Court noted that "Louisiana,
however, has chosen a different course ' 92 by deciding to elect candidates
for its Supreme Court in contested elections. The majority did not remark on the wisdom or foolhardiness of the State of Louisiana's decision
to elect its judges. The Court was respectful of the state's choice, even
though it did not hold up the model as ideal.93 Finally, citing its decision
in Gregory, the majority pointed out that the Supreme Court "has recently
recognized that judges do engage in policymaking at some level." 94 In
holding that elected judges are representatives as that term is defined in
the Voting Rights Act, the Court held in Chisom and Houston Lawyers'
that where judges are elected, those elections must be conducted in accordance with the Act to give minority voters an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice.9'
Although the Court found that the Voting Rights Act covers judicial
elections, the Court in Houston Lawvyers'--the trial judges case-reemphasized the importance of the state's interest in how judicial elections
are conducted because of the importance of promoting judicial impartiality. First, the Court specifically noted the long-standing tradition of
electing state court judges;Texas has elected state judges since 1861.96 The
Court then recognized Texas' interest in maintaining an at-large countywide system for electing trial judges. The State argued that county-wide
as opposed to single-member district-based elections for county judges
served its interest in linking the jurisdiction and elective base for trial

88.

See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 380; see also Houston Lawyers', 501 U.S. at 428.

89.
Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act states that the rights of minority groups
are violated if election procedures or practices used by a subdivision afford minorities
"'less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.'" Chisom, 501 U.S. at 395 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2 (1973)).
Id. at 400.
90.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See id.
94.
See id.at 399 n.27 (citing Gregory v.Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
95.
See id at 399 n.26.
96.
See Houston Lawyers'Ass'n v.Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991).
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judges because at-large elections would promote judicial impartiality and
accountability. 9 The Court credited this interest as a factor to be considered by the lower court on remand in determining whether the Texas
election system violated the Voting Rights Act. 98 In fact, on remand the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this interest articulated by the
State outweighed the plaintiffs' vote dilution claim. 99
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' articulated principles remarkably similar to those articulated by the Court in Gregory: (1) states have an
important interest in determining how judges are selected for office; and
(2) the judicial function is not limited solely to that of impartial, neutral
legal interpretation. In Gregory, the Court recognized the policy-making
function of judges, and in Chisom and Houston Lawyers', the Court recognized that elected judges can exercise a representative function.
Yet the Court's decision in White stands in stark contrast, in both
tone and substance, to the Court's 1991 stance in Gregory, Chisom, and
Houston Lawyers'.Justice Scalia, who sided with the majority in Gregory to
uphold the importance of the state's sovereign power in determining the
qualifications of judicial officers, accorded only the slightest deference to
Minnesota's Announce Clause rationale of preserving the impartiality of
the bench. His narrow definition of impartiality in the context ofjudging
fails to take account of the policy-making function of common law
judges that the Court acknowledged in Gregory. Minnesota's concern
with preserving the core function ofjudges as neutral interpreters of the
law while acknowledging the policymaking dimension of common law
judging was disregarded by the majority in White. But it is Minnesota's
attempt to mediate these two aspects of the judicial function that justifies
its imposition of restrictions on candidate speech in judicial elections.
Justice O'Connor's views appear to have undergone the most dramatic transformation between the 1991 Term and Mhite. Justice
O'Connor, who authored the majority opinion in Gregory and joined the
majority in both Chisom and Houston Lawyers', explicitly scorned the State
in White for its decision to elect judges. This is a particularly peculiar posture for Justice O'Connor, who was herself an elected state judge in
Arizona, first on a trial court from 1975-1979 and later on the Arizona
Court of Appeals from 1979-1981. Her opinion in Gregory, like that of
the majority opinions she joined in Chisom and Houston Lawyers', developed a nuanced and careful discussion about the role of judges as
policymakers and appeared to reflect her personal knowledge of the complexity of common law judging. Her participation in the majority
opinions in Chisom and Houston Lawyers' reflected a deep respect for the
97.
Id. at 426-27.
98.
Id.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F2d 728, 874 (5th Cir.
99.
1993). The Supreme Court declined to review the case on certiorari, and the countywide
election system remains in place in Texas for trial judges.
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determination of state voters about how best to select their judicial officers.Yet in White, Justice O'Connor's strident concurrence reflects none
of this sensitivity and thoughtfulness.
Although most states originally provided for the appointment of
their judges, by the mid-1800s, state voters were influenced by principles
ofJacksonian democracy and sought to make judges more accountable to
and representative of the people.1 °° Thus the move to select judges by
election rather than by appointment was a "highly self-conscious choice
of [state] poicy." ' 'O By the outbreak of the Civil War, twenty-two states
had adopted partisan elections as the method of selecting their judges02
Yet Justice O'Connor, who in Gregory deferred to what she acknowledged is Missouri's likely incorrect generalization about the fitness of
judges to serve in office after age seventy, disparaged Minnesota's attempt
to maintain its 150-year history of electing judges while protecting the
legitimacy and impartiality of the bench in White. Minnesota's attempt to
balance these interests is not the curious project of a rogue state. It is a
task undertaken by the majority of states that have adopted either Announce or Pledges and Promises Clauses and by the ABA in its Model
Code. The importance of reconciling these two interests animates much
of the ABA Model Code's Canon 5, which sets standards for the campaigns and political activities of judges.0 5 Yet to Justice O'Connor, the
problem in Mhite was a simple one: "If the State [of Minnesota] has a
upon
problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought
' 4
itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. 0
Ultimately Justice Ginsburg reminded the Court of its own jurisprudence from the 1991 Term and admonished:
This Court has recognized in the past, as Justice O'Connor
does today, ... a "fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral
politics." We have no warrant to resolve that tension, however,
by forcing States to choose one pole or the other. Judges are
not politicians, and the First Amendment does not require that
they be treated as politicians simply because they are chosen by
popular vote. 105

See David Adamany & Philip DuBois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. Rv.
100.
731,769 (1976).
JAMEs HURST, THE GROWTH Or AMERICAN LAW 140 (1950).
102.
John L. Hill, Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics:An Argument for Merit Selection, 40
BAYLOR L. R.EV. 339,346 (1988).
103.
SeeJOFREY M. SHIAMAN,JUDICIAL CONDUCT AmD ETHics 366-70 (3d ed. 1995).
101.

104.
105.

Republican Party of Minn v. White, 536 U.S. 765,792 (2002).
Id. at 821 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Crediting the long-standing tradition of state judicial elections, Justice
Ginsberg noted:
For more than three-quarters of a century, States like Minnesota have endeavored, through experiment tested by
experience, to balance the constitutional interests in judicial
integrity and free expression within the unique setting of an
elected judiciary. The Announce Clause, borne of this long effort, "comes to this Court bearing a weighty title of respect." °6
B. ContrastingJustice O'Connor's Opinion in White with
Her Stance in Grutter and McConnell
Justice O'Connor's metamorphosis between the 1991 judges cases
and her posture in White in 2001 is made even more curious by Justice
O'Connor's reputation as a mediating and pragmatic voice on the Court.
Her willingness to accord deference to state interests was solidified a year
after White, when the Court decided the highly contentious affirmative
action cases involving the admissions practices of the University of
Michigan and the University of Michigan Law School ("Law School").
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger17 stands in
stark contrast to her posture in White. In Grutter,Justice O'Connor accorded great deference to the state's articulated interest in racial diversity,
finding it sufficiently compelling to outweigh the Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by white' ° students seeking admission to the
University of Michigan Law School.'0 9 Specifically Justice O'Connor deferred "to the Law School's judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission."" Justice O'Connor deemed the state's interest,
"ground[ed] ... in the academic freedom that 'long has been viewed as
special concern of the First Amendment"',," to be sufficiently compelling
to trump the white applicants' equality concerns.112
Justice O'Connor's reasons for finding the State's interest compelling
were highly pragmatic ones. She cited the briefs of Fortune 500 CEOs
106.
Id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
107.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
108.
At the author's request and contrary to the Journals policy, the terms white and
black are not capitalized. African American and Caucasian, where they appear, are capitalized.
109.
539 U.S. at 343.
110.
Id. at 328.
111.
Id. at 324 (quoting Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1979)
(opinion of Powell,J.)).
112.
Id. at 325 (stating that "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions").
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who argued that globalization has made a diverse workforce critically important1 3 and the briefs of retired military officers who described the
importance of a diverse military to "'fulfill its principle [sic] mission to
Justice O'Connor also recognized that elite
provide national security.' ,...
institutions like the University of Michigan "represent the training ground
for a large number of our Nation's leaders.""' She reasoned that racial
diversity among the students at these institutions is essential "[i]n order to
citizenry."' 16
cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
Taken together, the basis on which Justice O'Connor finds the Law
School's interest in diversity compelling is a highly pragmatic sense of the
real world consequences of a racially exclusive system of higher education.
This same pragmatism and deference to a state's "judgment"1 7 and regard
for the appearance of legitimacy among the nation's leaders are absent
from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in White, where the state of Minnesota articulated its interest in fostering the legitimacy of the bench in the
eyes of the public as its rationale for the Announce Clause.
Moreover, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor deferred to the Law
School's use of Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") scores as a core part
of its admissions process-a practice that arguably, like the election of
judges in Minnesota, creates the problem that the Law School seeks to
correct.1 s But Justice O'Connor did not merely conclude that the University of Michigan Law School's problem with diversity is one of its own
making because it continues to use LSAT scores as a core admissions indicator. Nor did she conclude that the Law School should solve the
problem of insufficient diversity by simply giving up its interest in being
an elite institution. Instead, Justice O'Connor thought that the Law
School need not "choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence" and achieving diversity."9 Yet it is precisely this kind of choice that
Justice O'Connor forces on states in White when she asserts that if a state
elects its judges, it cannot impose meaningful restrictions on candidate
speech in order to protect the impartiality of the bench.
Justice O'Connor's 2003 co-authored majority opinion in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission2 drew an even more disturbing
comparison to her opinion in White. In McConnell, Justice O'Connor
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 330.
Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
Id. at 332.
Id.

Id. at 328 (deferring to the law school's "educational judgment").
117.
The University of Michigan Law School "must consider the race of applicants
118.
because a critical mass of underrepresented minority students could not be enrolled if
admissions decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores." Id.
at 318 (citation omitted).
119.
Id. at 339.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
120.
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deferred to Congress' determination that campaign spending limits are
necessary in order to protect against the appearance of corruption and
illegitimacy in federal elections.12' Although these limits go "to the heart
of" First Amendment rights,122 Justice O'Connor found that Congress'
concern was sufficient to overcome the free speech rights of potential
contributors. This balance is precisely the kind that states like Minnesota
have attempted to strike between the First Amendment rights of judicial
candidates and the legitimacy of the bench in the eyes of voters. Yet Justice O'Connor failed to credit this interest in White while deferring to
the very same articulated interest in McConnell.
Justice O'Connor's position in White, contrasted with McConnell, is
particularly troubling because the State of Minnesota specifically advanced
the importance of fostering the "public's confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary" as one of the compelling state interests supporting the Announce Clause. 2 Concern with the perception of
impartiality is particularly compelling in the context of judicial elections
because the Supreme Court has held and Congress has agreed that the
2
1
mere appearance of bias may violate the due process rights of litigants.'
In fact a majority of the Court that included Justice O'Connor determined in 1989 that "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately
depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."', 2 Moreover, in McConnell, which concerned the election of legislators and
executive officers, Congress was not bound by the constitutional obligation of impartiality that binds states in determining how to select their
judges.Yet in McConnell,Justice O'Connor recognized the importance of
preventing" 'both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process
through the appearanceof corruption ,116
Even more than the substance, the language and tone of Justice
O'Connor's opinions in McConnell and Grutter contrast disturbingly with
her tone in White. In McConnell and Grutter,Justice O'Connor struck a
pragmatic and compromising tone, deferring to Congress' attempt to balance the free speech rights of candidates and contributors against the
importance of promoting the legitimacy of the political process in the
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 248 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123.
Republican Party of Minn. v.White, 536 U.S. 765, 817 (2002) (citing Tr. of Oral
Arg. 16).
124.
See Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1993
& Supp. 2004) (providing for the recusal ofjudges whose impartiality might be "reasonably questioned"). Section 455(a) reflects Congress' concern "with the appearance of
impropriety," rather than actual bias. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 872 (1988) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
125.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,407 (1989).
126.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 94-95 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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eyes of voters. She was both respectful and conciliatory when describing
the interests of both Congress and the State of Michigan. By contrast, in
White her tone was scolding and dismissive of the State's attempt to balance its tradition of electing judges with preserving the appearance of
impartiality on the bench-an appearance that is compelled by the Due
Process Clause. How do we account for this metamorphosis in Justice
O'Connor's approach in White?
C. Recent Challenges to the Impartiality ofArticle IIIjudges
Perhaps underlying the open hostility toward judicial elections expressed by a majority of the Justices on the Court is their own frustration
at the recent public challenges to the impartiality of federal judges who,
because they are appointed for life, have traditionally been regarded as the
most independent and impartial judges in the world. In White, the majority described the system of appointing life-tenured federal judges as a
kind of "gold-standard" of judicial selection conceived by the Framers to
maximize the impartiality of the bench. Even in the earlier cases of Chisom and Houston Lawyers', the Court idealized this method of selecting
Article III judges as the one best able to produce an impartial bench in
which judges are freed from concerns about public opinion. 2
However, increasing and strident public challenges to the impartiality of Article III judges plagued the federal court nomination process
during the 1990s. Since 1991, the federal bench has faced increasingly
open and ugly challenges to the impartiality of its judges and to the integrity of the federal appointment process. The nomination of Clarence
Thomas to the Court in 1992 was among the ugliest and most contentious in the history of Supreme Court nominations." 9 Appointments to
the federal bench during the tenure of President Clinton were routinely
marked by politically and racially divisive battles on Capitol Hill. 30 In
several instances, decisions by federal judges were publicly labeled as

White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There is general consensus
127.
that the design of the Federal Constitution, including lifetime tenure and appointment by
nomination and confirmation, has preserved the independence of the Federal Judiciary.").
Chisolm v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1990) ("The Framers of the
See, e.g.,
128.
established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected,
Constitution ...
and would be sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection.").
For the full transcript of the extraordinary hearings on the Thomas nomination,
129.
see Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. Parts 1-4

(1991).
130.

See, e.g., Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1999, at 52, 52-53.
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"activist:' "soft on crime," or "liberal" by politicians and commentators. 3 1
In at least one instance during a presidential election year, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President publicly criticized a federal judge's evidentiary decision in a drug case. "2 Calls for the judge's
impeachment were bandied about,'3" and the judge ultimately vacated his
own decision.'34 On another occasion, a federal judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited increasing political scrutiny of judicial
decisions as part of the reason for his resignation from the bench.' 5
Throughout this decade of challenges to the impartiality of Article
III judges, the Supreme Court maintained a high approval rating among
Americans and was widely regarded as the most admired of the three
branches of government. ' But this status was shaken in the winter of
2000-2001 after the Court's notorious decision in the presidential election case, Bush v. Gore.'1 The Court's five to four majority decision was8
widely criticized by liberal, moderate, and even conservative lawyers.'
Many deemed it to be outright partisan.'"9 Others suggested that it at least
gave the appearance of an ideologically driven decision, which some
commentators deemed to be just as harmful in the context of the contested presidential election.'40 Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas were
particularly singled out for charges of bias in the case. "1
131.
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse,Judgesas Political Issues, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at
Al; Neil MacFarquhar, FederalJudge to Resign, Citing Political Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1996, at B4.
132.
See Allison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudge to Relent, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at
Al (describing firestorm of reaction to decision ofJudge Harold Baer to grant defendant's
motion to suppress evidence in a drug case).
133.
See R. Eugene Pincham, Commentary, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, Ciii.
TRiB., May 23, 1996, at 30 (criticizing Bob Dole, Newt Gingrich, and Rudolph Giuliani
for threatening to attempt to impeach Judge Harold Baer).
134.
See United States v. Bayless, 921 F.Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See MacFarquhar, supra note 131, at B4 (stating Judge H. Lee Sarokin's inability
135.
to ignore political attacks as rationale for resignation).
136.
See John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Perception of the Supreme Court in
the 1990s, 82 JuDicATulaE 66 (1998).

137.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).

138.

See, e.g.,

PICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE

2000

ELECTION, THE

COURTS 166-67 (2001); Robert G. Kaiser, Slim Majority Raises
Fearof Court Partisanship,WASH. PosT., Dec. 10, 2000, at A32; Randall Kennedy, Contempt of
Court,AM. PROSPECT,Jan. 1,2001, at 15;Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace:The Supreme Court Commits
Suicide, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,2000, at 18.
139.
See, e.g., Mary McGrory, Supreme Travesty ofJustice, WAsH. PosT., Dec. 14, 2000, at
A3.
140.
See POSNER, supra note 138, at 166-67 (agreeing with the outcome of Bush v.
Gore but criticizing Justice Scalia's leadership role in stopping the recount and Scalia's
concurrence in the case for creating the impression of partisanship).
CONSTITUTION, AND THE

See JEFFREY TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THEIRTY-Six DAY BATTLE TO DE141.
CIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); Democrat Urges Scalia to Bow Out of Florida Case,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 2000, at 9A; Christopher Marquis, Job of Thomas' Wife
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Several Justices who joined the majority in Bush v. Gore took pains
42
in the weeks after the decision to defend the impartiality of the Court.
A number of the Justices were reportedly stunned by the vehemence of
public criticism of the Court's decision. 43 The sting of this unusual public
censure has likely remained with the Court and was renewed during the
2004 Term when legal commentators and the media questioned for several months whether Justice Scalia should recuse himself from a highprofile case involving Vice President Dick Cheney.Justice Scalia took the
unusual step of issuing a twenty-page opinion explaining why he would
not recuse himself from a case involving his self-described "friend," Vice
144
President Cheney, with whom he had taken a recent duck-hunting trip.
The issuance of the detailed recusal opinion after weeks of negative media
coverage evidenced the Court's increasing sensitivity to the public's perception of the Court's impartiality. A few weeks later, Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed 4to appoint a commission to look at judicial ethics issues
5
for federal courts.1

Given the increased public and media scrutiny directed at the Court
since Bush v. Gore, the Court has little basis for laying the full weight of
public concern about the impartiality ofjudges at the feet of elected state
judiciaries. The denunciation of judicial elections by both Justices Scalia
and O'Connor as irreconcilable with judicial impartiality in White may in
fact reflect the Court's own deeply self-conscious concern about the public's growing lack of confidence in the impartiality of judges overall.
Certainly Chief Justice Rehnquist in his 2004 Year-End Report recognized that the impartiality of the federal bench has been threatened by
negative public reaction to decisions by federal judges.'4 By setting up a
simple dichotomy between appointing and electing judges--one method
guaranteeing impartiality and the other creating biased judges-the Court
in White embraces a narrow and misleading conception of impartiality.'47
Raises Conflict-of-Interest Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A26; Evan Thomas & Michael lsikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at 46 (reporting that
Justice O'Connor reacted with dismay when she heard initial reports that Vice President
Gore had won the 2000 Presidential election). I strongly criticized the failure of several of
the Justices to address what I deem to be legitimate grounds for their recusal from Bush v.
Gore. See Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 11.
142.
See HowARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 172-73 (2001); Neil A. Lewis,Justice Thomas Speaks Out
on a Timely Topic, Several of Them, in Fact, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A23.
143.
See Joan Biskupic, Election Still Splits Court, USA ToDAv,Jan. 22, 2001, at 1A.
144.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mere.).
145.
Rehnquist Orders Study on Ethics, N.Y TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A19.
146.
See CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf
147.
It is no surprise then to read Justice Scalia's 2004 decision on the question of
recusal in Cheney and to discover that Justice Scalia cannot conceive of how a reasonable
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Ill. SEEING THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS THROUGH
THE LENS OF DIVERSITY:ThE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL

IMPARTIALITY TO DUE PROCESS

White has strengthened the hand of advocates of an appointed state
judiciary, and even those who disagree with the decision itself believe that
the removal of restrictions on candidate speech will turn judicial elections
into a virtual free-for-all that will threaten impartiality. 48 Special interest
groups favoring unlimited judicial candidate speech have been invigorated
by the decision. 149 Overbroad interpretations of the case have led some
states to remove virtually all restrictions on judicial candidate speech.""
Even the American Bar Association directed a Working Group on the
First Amendment and Judicial Campaigns to evaluate sections of the ABA
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct to ensure its consistency with White. '
Yet as states and the American Bar Association grapple with how to
respond to White, the question of how methods ofjudicial selection affect
racial diversity is a little-studied issue. However, the question of diversity is
a vital one that speaks directly to the issue of impartiality.
Racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in state judiciaries. Blacks constitute only 4.4% of the state judiciary. Latinos, reportedly
the largest minority group in the country,1 1 3 comprise only 3.0% of the
state bench.1 4 Even in states where blacks constitute nearly or more than
30% of the population, such as Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
the percentage of blacks on the judiciary has remained disturbingly

person might question his impartiality. to decide a case with potentially important political
implications for his self-described "friend,"Vice President Cheney. 541 U.S. at 913 (2004)

(mem.).
See David B. Bogard, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The Lifting of
148.
Judicial Speech Restraint, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1 (2003);Jonathan L. Entin,Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 523 (2002); Michelle T. Friedland,
Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 563, 617 (2004); see also Ofer Raban,JudicialImpartiality and the Regulation
of Judicial Election Campaigns, 15 U. FlA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 220 (2004); Laurence H.
Tribe, The UnbearableWrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. ComM. 571, 602 (2002).
See Mike France et al., The Battle Over the Courts: How Politics,Ideology, and Spe149.
cial Interests Are Compromising the US.Justice System, Bus.WK., Sept. 27, 2004, at 36.
150.
See N.C. CODE Or JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1), (2), (4) (2003).
151.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE & ABA STANDING COMM.
ON Emics AND PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7 (Aug. 2003),
available at http://wwwabanet.org/judind/udicialethics/amendments.pdf.
Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American
152.
Courts, 10 MIcH.J. RACE & L. 153, 184 tbl.2 (2004).
153.
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Reaches an All-Time
High of 38.8 Million, New Census Bureau Estimates Show (June 18, 2003), at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/cbO3-100.html.
Graham, supra note 152, at 184 tbl.2.
154.

FALL 2004]

Through the Lens of Diversity

small. 155 In New York, which has the second largest Latino population in
the country,1 6 Latinos make up only 1.6% of state court judges and 2.9%
of federal judges."' Moreover, racial and gender bias in the court system
continues to be a reality.158
I have argued in earlier articles that judicial impartiality requires
more than the lack of bias of individual judges. 159 Impartiality has a structural dimension as well that implicates the bench as a whole and that is
directly connected to diversity. When describing structural impartiality, I
refer to the overall composition of the bench in a jurisdiction. In my
work, I have argued that the Due Process Clause entitles litigants to appear not only before an individual judge who is not biased but also before
a judge selected from a structurally impartial bench. I analogize here to
the jury. Thirty years ago the Supreme Court held that the due process
rights of litigants are violated when a system for selecting jury venires
results in the exclusion of racial minorities or women.6 In Peters v. Kiff,
Justice Marshall explained why jury decision-making suffers when racial
minorities are excluded: "When any large and identifiable segment of the
155.
See id. at 173-74 & 185-86 tbl.3 (2004) (finding that Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina rank amongst the worst states in black population/black judge disparity
ratios.
156.
Tom Perrotta, Study: New York Is Among Worst in Appointing Hispanics to Bench,
N.Y L.J., Mar. 19, 2002, at 6.
157.
Id.
158.
See, e.g., IND. SuriEME COURT COIMMs'N ON RACE AND GENDER FAIRNESS, ExEctirrvE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5-6 (2002) (finding that over one third of
respondents report observing "courtroom harassment and disparagement on the basis of
gender, ethnicity or race, including by judicial officers"); SELECT COMMITTEE ON GENDER
EQUALITY, RErROSPECTrE REPORT 5 (Oct. 2001) (finding that 56% of minority court employees in Maryland say that racial and ethnic bias had either increased or stayed the same
in the previous five years); COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SvSTEM, FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND

GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 129 (2001) (finding that "after controlling for legally
prescribed factors and mode of conviction ... race, ethnicity, gender, and age definitely
affect sentencing outcomes of all kinds"); Press Release, Mississippi Administrative Office
of the Courts, Court Gender Fairness Task Force Issues Findings and Recommendations
(Nov. 27, 2002) (concluding that "gender bias is not a widespread problem," although two-

thirds of Mississippi judges, lawyers, and court personnel believe that there is unfairness
towards women in the court, and nearly half of female attorneys believe that they are
treated in a less dignified or unequal manner than their male counterparts). All of these
sources are available at National Center for State Courts, Race and Gender Fairness in the
Courts: Task Force, Commission, and Committee Reports, at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/
Pubhcations/KISRacEthStLnks.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
159.
See Ifill,Judging the Judges, supra note 8; 1fill, Beyond Role Models, supra note 8.
160.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment affords a defendant the opportunity to have women on his or her jury); see
also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (holding that "[wihatever his race, a criminal
defendant has standing to challenge the system used to select his ... jury, on the ground
that it arbitrarily excludes from service the members of any race and thereby denies him
due process of law").
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community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the
experience,
jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
161
the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."'
The Court was careful to distinguish the venire from the petit jury
Litigants are not entitled to have members of a particular race or gender
on their juries, but the pool from which their jurors are selected-the
venire-must reflect the diversity of the community.162 The Court based
this not only on the Sixth Amendment "fair cross-section" requirement
due
for the selection of juries but also on the Fourteenth Amendment
163
process right of litigants to appear before an impartial tribunal.
I argue that the Due Process Clause compels a similar result for the
judiciary. As with a petit jury, litigants do not have the right to appear before a judge of a particular race or gender. But the bench itself-the pool
from which a litigant's particular judge is selected-must include qualified
members from a cross-section of the community. In other words, structural impartiality is required for the judicial bench, just as it is required for
the jury venire. Diversity produces structural impartiality. Judicial selection
systems that do not produce this structural impartiality or diversity run
afoul of the due process impartial tribunal mandate.
Moreover, racial and gender diversity help ensure that judicial decision-making includes the variety of competing perspectives and
viewpoints that exist in the community. As Justice Marshall suggested in
the context of jury decision-making,'6 judicial decision-making that fails
to include racial minorities and women is impoverished by the absence of
the kind of diverse perspectives and viewpoints that enhance informed
legal decision-making. In this regard, diversity should be viewed by the
bench and bar as an imperative required to. fulfill the due process impartial
judge mandate and as critically important to enhance the legitimacy of
judicial decision-making.
One need not assume that a particular minority judge will be in a
position to represent these "outsider" views and perspectives. Not every
minority judicial candidate will be a "diversity" candidate. In some instances, a white judge may satisfy the need for diversity by considering
outsider perspectives or viewpoints in his decision-making that would
otherwise be excluded from judicial deliberations 16An important dimension of the diversity question for the judiciary is whether a particular
161.
Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
162.
See, e.g., Morgan v Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (finding that "[a] fair trial
163.
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process") (quoting In re Marchison, 349 U.S.
133,136 (1955)); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-28.
164.
Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.
For an example of how a white judge can, in his decision-making, "represent"
165.
the perspective of a minority community, see Ifill, Beyond Role Models, supra note 8, at
488-95.
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judicial candidate can represent the views of marginalized or outsider
groups, not simply whether the judge himself belongs to a minority
group. In order to gain the benefits of diversity, one must look both to the
race of the judge and to his ability and willingness to bring otherwise unor underrepresented perspectives to the bench. To assume that every black
candidate brings perspective diversity to the bench essentializes black judicial candidates and creates opportunities for cynical manipulation of the
diversity ideal. This phenomenon is perhaps best exemplified by the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Even
though his views on important legal issues do not reflect those of the vast
majority of blacks, he was appointed as a "diversity" judge. I have called
this kind of diversity cosmetic, rather than substantive. 16 To suggest that
blacks are represented on the Supreme Court in any substantive way by
Justice Thomas subverts the very idea of diversity.
Recognizing that judges can and do perform a representative function without compromising their impartiality is an important analytical
step in solving the diversity crisis. 167 Diversity provides the bench with
judges who can bring to their deliberations the broad range of perspectives and viewpoints that exist in the community. Diversity does not
guarantee or require that minority judges favor minority litigants any
more than the current lack of diversity begets an expectation that white
judges will favor white litigants. Nor does the race or gender of a judge
predict the outcome of a case. Instead diversity provides a more limited,
but nevertheless important, contribution to judicial decision-making. It
affords an opportunity for alternative or "outsider" perspectives to be included in the process of judicial decision-making and in the courthouse.
For minority communities that are increasingly overrepresented among
the population of criminal defendants"8 and incarcerated persons, 9 the
For a more complete discussion of cosmetic diversity as it relates to judges and
166.
representation, see id, at 479-95.
For a more in-depth discussion of the ways that judges-especially trial
167.
judges-function as "representatives," see Ifill, Judging the Judges, supra note 8, at 134-48.
Also, for a discussion of how the representative function ofjudging can be reconciled with
the obligation to be impartial, see Ifill, Beyond Role Models, supra note 8, at 465-79.
See The Sentencing Project, Publications: Racial Disparity, at http://www.
168.
sentencingproject.org/pubs_08.cfin; see also Testimony of Bryan Stevenson, Executive Director of the Equal Justice of Initiative of Alabama (Nov. 22, 2002), reported in AMERICAN
BAR AsSOCIATION,JusTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATIoN COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 57 (June 2003), available at http://

61
www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/pubications/jeopardy-2 00 3 0 3/
justiceinjeopardy.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY] (noting that "73% of felony defendants in Alabama are people of color, [yet] when they appear at trial: '[tihey face a white
judge.They face a white prosecutor.... [Firequently, they are the only person of color in
the court.' ").
Over 60% of the prison population in the United States is made up of non169.

whites. See PAIGE M.

HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU Or JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN:

PmSONERS IN 2002, at 9 (July 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
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importance of including these perspectives in judicial decision-making
goes to the very heart of both the perception and the reality of the legitimacy of the legal system.
As a number ofjurisdictions begin to rethink their models of electing judges after White, structural impartiality and diversity should be
central parts of the discussion. In most jurisdictions, I fear they are not.
Even where diversity is discussed and considered, it is rarely regarded as
essential to either the impartiality or the integrity of the bench.
A. The Potential Effects of Electoral Changes on Diversity
1. Switching from Election to Appointment
The view that appointing judges, or so-called "merit selection," is a
far superior alternative to electing judges has remained largely unchallenged. The American Bar Association has for years recommended the
Missouri Plan as the preferred method for state judicial selection. 7' In
addition,Justice O'Connor devoted a good portion of her concurrence in
White to explaining how the Missouri Plan for selecting judges operates.17 1 Under this system, which has been adopted by thirty-eight states,
an executive-usually the governor-appoints judges who then face periodic retention elections. 7' But the wholesale embrace of the Missouri
Plan as a cure-all for potential impartiality issues raised by head-to-head
judicial contests ignores the number of instances in which retention elections have been characterized by the same kind of contentious,

p02.pdf. 12% of black men between the ages of twenty and thirty-four are in jail or prison,
as compared to 1.6% of white men. Fox Butterfield, Prison Rates Among Blacks Reach a
Peak Study Finds, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/
07/national/07PRIS.htm. States like Pennsylvania,Wisconsin, and Connecticut incarcerate
blacks at upwards of ten times the rate of whites. See The Sentencing Project, Report Summary: Intended and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment (2004),
available at http://wvw.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9050summary.pdf (citing figures from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics). Twelve states and the District of Columbia incarcerate
blacks at a rate more than ten times that of whites. Id.
170.
Instead racial diversity is mostly advocated as important for preserving public
confidence in the judiciary. See, e.g.,JusilCE INJEOPARDY, supra note 168, at 60.
171.
RicHARD A. WATSON & RoNDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND
Tu, BAR:JUDICIALI SELECTION UNDER THE MIssoum NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 7-9 (1969)

(describing the development of the Plan and its initial adoption by the ABA in 1937);
ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDAROs iv (July 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/

judind/downloads/reformat.pdf.
172.
Republican Party of Minn. v.White, 536 U.S. 765,791-92 (2002) (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring).
173.
Id. at 788-92 (O'Connor,J., concurring); Hill, supra note 102, at 353.
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ideologically-driven politics as contested judicial elections.174 Perhaps the
most famous of these retention elections is that ofJustice Rose Bird, who
lost her seat on the California Supreme Court after well-funded prodeath penalty interest groups launched a bitter and negative campaign
against her.17 The Bird retention election still stands as one of the most
bitterly divisive and political judicial races in the nation.
Studies that have examined the effect of appointment versus election of judges on diversity have produced conflicting results.7 6 These
studies, which rely exclusively on counting the number of black or minority judges on a court as the appropriate benchmark for measuring
diversity, may fail to address the issue of structural impartiality. Diversity
cannot be measured solely by counting black or brown faces on the
bench. To get beyond cosmetic diversity, we must examine as well
whether diverse perspectives are represented on the bench, and whether
black judges appointed to the bench are those who would be endorsed by
the black community.
The standards used to assess vote dilution claims under the Voting
Rights Act are instructive on this point. Judicial elections, when conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, must give minority
voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to
elect candidates of their choice. 7 An elective system that adds black faces
to the bench, but not those that would be the candidates of choice of minority communities, frustrates the ability of blacks to participate equally
in the political process. The same is true if an appointive system yields
171
more black judges who are not those endorsed by the black community_
174.
Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign
Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 505, 512 (1999); G. Alan Tarr, Reform Proposals: Rethinking the
Selection of State Supreme CourtJustices, 39 WiLLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1449 (2003).
175.
John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics ofJudicialAccountability
in California,70 JUDICArURE 81, 87-89 (1986);John T.Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat
of the CaliforniaJustices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue ofJudicial Accountability, 70
JUDIcATURE 348,349 (1986).
176.
See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106
DICK. L. REv. 729 (2002); see also Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the
Judicial Merit Selection Process:A Statistical Report, in HUNTER CTR. FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RtESEARCi ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999, at 1-32 (2000);
Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, Wat Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection
Make?: Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JusT. Sys.J. 25-44 (1979).
177.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2004).
178.
Indeed black judicial nominees may be selected to advance an agenda that is
directly at odds with the interests of black communities. See Peter Beinart, No Appeal, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 28, 2001 (arguing that the Bush Administration has realized that its rightwing judges had better be minority or female) For this reason, the ability and willingness
of appointed judicial candidates to represent traditionally unrepresented or "outsider" perspectives is a critically important part of the larger diversity inquiry. Race and gender
often correlate with precisely the kind of "outsider" perspectives and viewpoints that can
enrich judicial decision-making. Nevertheless, one cannot assume that the race or gender
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In fact, shifting the power of initial judicial selection to a jurisdiction's executive-whether mayor or governor-may further dilute the
electoral power of minority voters. Blacks constitute a majority of the
voting population in only a handful of major American cities,75 and
blacks do not constitute the majority of the voting population of any
state. This means that in most instances white voters, particularly at the
state level, control who will be elected to executive office. In most states,
the candidate of choice of most white voters in gubernatorial elections is
not the same as the candidate of choice of most black voters."s In those
states, black voters under a Missouri Plan system are simply further removed from meaningful participation in the selection of the state's
judges. 8 '
In addition, strong evidence suggests that racially polarized voting
continues to exist in judicial elections.1 12 In several counties in Maryland,
for example, white voters consistently refuse to vote for incumbent black
judges who have been appointed by the state's governor. 18 In some instances, white voters selected white lawyers with no judicial experience
over highly qualified black incumbents.8 In Baltimore County, a majority
white county in Maryland where 20% of the electorate is African Ameriof a judge will in and of itself guarantee diversityThus studying the effect ofjudicial selection methods on diversity requires a more nuanced and complex understanding of the
meaning and value of diversity
179.
SeeJesse McKinnon, U.S. Census Bureau, The Black Population:2000, Census 2000
Brief (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-5.pdf.
180.
A majority of black voters in the United States are Democrats. John H.
McWhorter, Commentary;As Racism Recedes, More Blacks Shift to Political Center, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2004, at B13 (citing statistics from the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies that 63% of black voters in 2002 were registered as Democrats). In states where
more than a simple majority of the white electorate votes Republican, the candidate of
choice of black voters, assuming all parties vote along party lines, typically cannot win.
Currently more than half the states in the country have Republican governors. See Republican Governors Association, available at http://www.rga.org/?page-id=54 (stating that
twenty-eight of the fifty governors are Republican).
181.
See, e.g., Brian Bakit, Pawlenty'sJudge Picks So FarAre All White, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PREss, July 1, 2004, at BI 6 (reporting that eleven judges appointed by a Republican governor in an eighteen month period were white).
182.
See, e.g., David Green, Blocs Determine Judicial Chances, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12,
2002, at 7B (maintaining that racially polarized voting in county judicial election resulted
in defeat of two black incumbent judges); Craig Timberg & Shanon D. Murray, Race Questions Linger in Howard Election, BAiT. SUN, Nov. 7, 1996, at 2B (describing poll results that
show a black incumbent judge running to retain her seat in Howard County, Maryland,
only won a majority of the votes in Columbia, Maryland, a community in the county that
has a sizable black population and "prides itself on racial tolerance").
183.
See, e.g., Timberg & Murray, supra note 182, at 1B; Norris West, Hill Staton Refuses to Be Bitter About Loss, BALT. SUN, Nov. 10, 1996 (describing loss of first black circuit
court judge in Howard County, Maryland, to white challenger).
184.
See Stephanie Hanes, Wright Is Trailing in Bid to Retain Circuit Court Seat: He Faces
Being Unseatedfor 2nd Time in Two Years, BALT. SuN, Nov. 6, 2002, at 1OB.
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can, voters retained a sitting black circuit court judge for the first time in
2004, but only after two years in which county leaders and commentators
publicly highlighted the shameful record of racially polarized voting in
the county.'ss Direct racial appeals still occur in some judicial races. In
Mississippi in 2004, supporters of a white circuit court judge who sought
to unseat a black supreme court justice in that state distributed 18posters
6
supporting the white challenger with the slogan: "He's One of Us.There is no reason to believe that racially polarized voting and racial
campaign appeals might not also infect retention election contests. Black
incumbent judges may face strong and organized efforts to remove them
from office in retention elections, just as black incumbent judges in contested judicial election systems often face regular and well-financed
challengers in majority white jurisdictions. 187 Thus, diversity may be
thwarted even when nominating commissions or governors first appoint
black judicial candidates because of racially polarized voting in retention
elections.
In addition, an appointive system may mask ways in which the
benefits of diversity may be undermined even though minority judges
have been appointed to the bench. For example, a governor may appoint
a black judicial candidate who is also the candidate of choice of a majority of black voters, only to see that judge turned out of office when he
faces a majority white electorate in his retention election. Such a governor may simply decide to appoint yet another black candidate to fill that
same seat who also will likely be voted out of office at a retention election. The governor may then reappoint the defeated black judge to
another court or to the same seat.' Thus black judges under a Missouri
185.

Stephanie Hanes,Judge First African American to Win Countywide Vote, BALT.SUN,

Mar. 4, 2004, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/loca/bal-md.judicial04
mar04,0,464589.story?collbal-local-headlines.
186.
LEDGER

See Eric Stringfellow, Molpus' Remarks Ring True in High Court Race, CLARIoN-

(Jackson, MS), July 4, 2004, available at http://www.clarionledger.com/
apps/phcs.dll/article?AID=120040704/coL0601/407040362; Sherrel Wheeler Stewart,
Curious Scarcity of Black State Supreme CourtJustices, BIACK AM. WEB NEWS, Aug. 20, 2004,
available at http://www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx/bawnew/judges. But see Judicial
CampaignAd Sparks Racial Controversy,DAY-roA BEAcH NEws-J., Aug. 17, 2002 (describing
controversy sparked by campaign literature of black judicial candidate in Tampa, Florida
that stated "Let's Support OurVery Own").
187.
Andrea E Siegel, CircuitJudges Face Challenge from Hopefuls, BALT. SUN, Feb. 29,
2004, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/loca/annearundel/bal-ar.judge29
feb29,1,2011292,print ("It once was rare for an incumbent judge to face a serious challenge, much less to lose. But in recent elections in two other mostly white counties, two of
[Maryland Governor] Glendening's African American Circuit Court appointees were
voted out.").
188.
After African American judge Alexander Wright Jr., the first black circuit court
judge in Baltimore County, was defeated by a white challenger in 2000, Governor Parris
Glendening appointed him to yet another circuit court seat in the County Judge Wright
was turned out of office again by majority white voters in Baltimore County in 2002 in
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Plan system may be turned out of office regularly in retention elections."' 9
With a governor's commitment to reappointing a minority judge, the
number of minority judges on the bench in the jurisdiction may remain
unchanged, giving the impression that the bench has achieved commendable levels of diversity. But many of the potential benefits of diversity are
lost when individual black judges are unable to remain in office for long
periods of time. They are unable to build the kind of seniority that leads
to influential administrative positions within the state judiciary and to
advancement to higher courts, and they are unable to influence the important patronage opportunities within the courthouse. 1' 9 A study that
looks only at the number of black judges serving but that does not analyze how long minority judges stay in office and whether they advance to
higher courts at the same rate as their white counterparts fails to reflect
accurately whether appointing judges increases diversity on the bench.
For jurisdictions covered by the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the question of how a shift from electing to appointing
judges will affect diversity is one that will have to be addressed before
appointive systems may be adopted. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
requires that jurisdictions listed in Section 4 of the Act-including at least
parts of most southern states 1 -- submit voting changes to either the Department ofJustice or the District Court for the District of Columbia for
preclearance before they may be adopted. The test for granting preclearance is whether a voting change will result in a "retrogression" of
minority voting power.1 92Therefore any jurisdiction covered by Section 4
of the Act that seeks to change its practices or procedures for the election
of judges will need to prove to either the Justice Department or the District Court for the District of Columbia that the change to appointing
judges will not adversely affect diversity on the bench.
Finally, the federal bench may be the best example of the dubious
potential of appointing judges to promote diversity. Blacks constitute
favor of yet another white challenger with no judicial experience. Jonathan D. Rockoff &
Stephanie Hanes, Judge's Loss Spurs Questions of. Racism: In Baltimore County, Some Say
Wright's Race a Factor;Others Note Ballot Order,BALT. SUN, Nov. 7, 2002, at lB.
189.
Anna Borgman, Voters' Rejection of Black Judge is Discouraging to Many People,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, 1996, at C8. This revolving door of black judges is demoralizing for

both the black judges and the voters who support them.
190.
I have described how the exercise of patronage and employment decisions by
judges presents opportunities for diversity on the bench to improve the judicial system. See
Ifill,Judging the Judges, supra note 8, at 139 (maintaining that an increase in minority and
women judges often leads to an increase in the appointment of minority and female judicial clerks, secretaries, and other court personnel). In sum, a diverse bench often leads to a
more diverse courthouse.
191.
See 28 C.FR. § 51 (appendix) (2003) (table ofjurisdictions covered under § 4(b)
of the Voting Rights Act, as amended). But coverage is not limited to the south. Three of
the boroughs of NewYork City are covered by the preclearance provisions as well. Id.
192.
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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10.3% of all Article III federal court judges.1 93 But this deceptively high
number masks some important facts. States with large black populations
are often the jurisdictions with the fewest black federal judges, 194 and
blacks appointed to the federal bench often may not be candidates supported by the African American community.9 Moreover, blacks are even
more underrepresented on the federal appeals courts. Of the 179 judges
on federal courts of appeals, only fourteen are black and eleven are Latino.1 96 Nor does the federal appointive system augur well for the
likelihood that appointing judges will depoliticize the judiciary. Not only
has the federal nominations process become increasingly and openly political, but as the bench becomes more ideologically split, judges on
increasingly have descended into open and public political
federal 19courts
7
battles.

Affirmative Action in the Courts: Here Are Some Reasons Why That's a Bad Place for
193.
Blacks to Be, 25J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 40, 42 (1999).
See, e.g., Experts Say Alabama Needs More Black FederalJudges, GADSDEN TIMES
194.
(Gadsden, Ala.), Dec. 24, 2002. Until President Clinton appointed a black judge to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as a recess appointment in the final days of his administration in 2000, that Court remained all white, despite the fact that the percentage of
blacks living in the states of the Fourth Circuit (Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) is among the highest of any federal circuit. See Mark Murray, Stayed from
the Bench, NAT'L J., Nov. 21, 1998, at 2799 (stating blacks make up 22% of residents living
in the Fourth Circuit). There are now two black judges sitting on the Fourth Circuit
bench. It has been twenty years since a black candidate was nominated and confirmed to
sit on the federal district court bench in Mississippi, yet the black population of that state
is over 30%. Currently only one black judge (who was nominated by President Reagan)
sits on the Mississippi federal district court bench. See Federal Judicial Center, History of the
Federaljudiciary,at http://www.ec.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 28,2005).
195.
David L. Green, Appeals Nominee is Idealfor GOP:Allen: The Man at the Center of
the 4th Circuit Flap is a Staunchly Conservative African American, BA.T. SUN, Nov. 27, 2003, at
1A; Daryl Fears, GOP Makes "Top Priority" of Converting Black Voters: Party Hopes Bush
Focus on Minorities Can Win 25%, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2003, at A4.The nomination of
Miguel Estrada to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was opposed by the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and other groups representing
the interests of Latinos. See, e.g., Antonia Hernandez, Latino Would Set Back Latinos, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A13; Edward Walsh, Hispanic Caucus to Oppose Estrada Nomination,
WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at A4.
196.
ALLIANCE FOR JUST. JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
23, at http://
OF THE GEORGE W BUSH ADMINISTRATION
FIRST Two YEARS
www.alliancefotjustice.org/inages/collection-images/2001-02-AFJ_Biennial Report.pdf
(Spring 2003) (breaking down 179 federal appellate court judges by parry, gender, and
ethnicity).
197.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F3d 732, 811 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Charles Lane, Disorder in the Court:Judges Squabble Over Proceedings Surrounding

Ohio Man's Stay of Execution, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,2001, at A3 (describing dispute between
Sixth Circuit judges over stay of execution for death row convict); Adam Liptak, Federal

Judge is Scolded for Attack, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, atA18 (stating that the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals strongly denounced an accusation by a black federal district judge that

the appellate court's reversal of his opinion was racially motivated).
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Clearly the question of how diversity will be affected when judges are
appointed rather than elected is a complex one. Difficult as it may be to
measure and tease out these complex and sensitive issues, they must be addressed forthrightly by jurisdictions contemplating changes to their judicial
election systems. The need for structural diversity and its relationship to
impartiality should compel jurisdictions to recognize the diversity question
as one of constitutional dimension.
2. Removing Campaign Speech Restrictions
Removing campaign speech restrictions may disadvantage black judicial candidates, who may be more vulnerable to distortions of their public
statements than white judicial candidates. The reality is that black judicial
candidates often face a steep uphill battle in majority white jurisdictions.
Racially polarized voting continues to be a fact of life in many jurisdictions. '98 Black incumbent judges may disproportionately face charges of
bias, with recusal motions often explicitly predicated on the black judge's
assumed racial allegiance to a litigant.1 99 Although black judges, particularly
at the federal level, have ably answered these charges of biass20 the records
of black judges may be more readily distorted to satisfy a stereotypical and
racist mindset. Thus a black judge may, despite
a record to the contrary, be
20 2
'
or "liberal. ' 20 3
deemed "soft on crime," "unqualified"
198.
See David Lublin, The Election of African Americans and Latinos to the US. House of
Representatives, 1972-1994, 25 AM.POL. Q. 269 (1997).
199.
See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed in
IfillJudging theJudges, supra note 8, at 114-19; Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
200.
Judge Constance Baker Motley was perhaps the most eloquent when, in denying a recusal motion filed by a defendant law firm in a gender-based employment
discrimination case, she observed:
Indeed, if background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or
many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex,
often with distinguished law firm or public service backgrounds.
Blank, 418 E Supp. at 4.
201.
The nomination of Missouri Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White to the federal district court in Missouri was scuttled when he was described as "pro-criminal" by
then-Senator John Ashcroft. Tim Bryant,Judge White Says Senate's Rejection of His Appointment Could Have A 'Chilling Effect', ST. Louis PosT-DisPATcH, Sept. 22, 2000, at A6.
202.
Calling into question the competence or professionalism of black judges often
plays to deeply embedded racial stereotypes. See, e.g., Ed Garvey, Milwaukee Media Do
Hatchet Job on Higginbotham, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wisc.), Feb. 4, 2003, at 9A (arguing
that opponents of a black judicial candidate in a race for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court played to racial stereotypes in suggesting that the candidate is "lazy").
203.
Itwas widely perceived that the decision by the lawyers of then-candidate
George H.W Bush to seek the recusal of black Judge Nikki Clark from hearing one of the
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Given this reality, the removal of candidate speech restrictions may
effectively result in robust First Amendment privileges for white judges
but not for minority judges, who may understandably fear that their impartiality may be questioned more aggressively than that of their white
counterparts. What a minority judge says on the campaign trail may be
subject to greater scrutiny and used to trigger latent racial impulses in a
majority white electorate. 2°
B. Re-ImaginingJudicial Elections
As I have argued throughout this Article, electing judges in and of
itself does not threaten the impartiality of the bench. Judges-whether
appointed or elected, federal or state-face increasing scrutiny by an often
cynical and misinformed public. Reforming the judicial selection process
is more complex than Justices Scalia and O'Connor suggest in White and
than the position taken by some states. White has created an opportunity
for states and their bars to re-examine how best to educate and inform
the public about the role of judges in our democracy. It also provides an
opportunity to educate judges and judicial aspirants about the nature of
impartiality, its structural and individual dimensions, and how judges can
strike a balance between representation and impartiality. Judicial elections
should not be abandoned simply because the Supreme Court thinks they
are a bad idea. Federalism concerns alone should encourage states to resist
the Court's heavy-handed dismissal of a state's interest in electing judges.
Instead, states as well as the bar should view post-White judicial selection
reforms as providing an opportunity to grapple with some of the difficult
and complex questions discussed above. Below are several initiatives that

many vote challenge cases in Bush v. Gore was because she was black. See

TOoIN,

supra

note 141, at 208-09; David Von Drehle et al., In a Dark Hour, A Last Minute Reprieve,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 2001, atA-1 (stating that it was believed by some members of the
Bush team that Judge Clark would be too liberal). One of Bush's lawyers reportedly explained that Judge Clark would likely receive pressure "from her own constituencies" to
decide the case against Bush. ToOBIN, supra note 141, at 209. Of the five or six trial judges
who participated in election challenge cases, Judge Clark-the only black, but not the

only Democrat-was the only judge asked to recuse herself Although the recusal motion
was denied and the denial upheld on appeal, unfounded recusal motions filed against black
candidates undermine the authority of black judges.
204.
Even when a minority judge is not campaigning, his statements may expose him
to disproportionate admonishment or a disproportionate number of recusal motions. See,
e.g.,
Adam Liptak, ArkansasJudge Sues a Disciplinary Panel Ovcr Free Speech, N.YTIMES, Dec.
18, 2002 (reporting on a black Arkansas appellate court judge's decision to fight the action
taken by the state judicial disciplinary commission to admonish the judge for statements
made before a group of legislators about a lack of diversity at the University ofArkansas);
see also Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F Supp. 155
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (denying recusal motion of white litigant who alleged judge's lack of impartiality based on judge's use of the word "we" when referring to blacks in speech).
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should be considered by states that elect judges and supported by advocates ofjudicial impartiality.
1. Define Impartiality
At a minimum, both the American Bar Association and the states
should set about defining impartiality in their respective Codes ofJudicial
Conduct. The ABA in particular should take a leadership role, as so many
states base provisions in their codes on the ABA Model Code. Changes to
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct could include language that
identifies structural impartiality as an important part ofjudicial impartiality. I have proposed two language amendments to the Commentary
Section of Canon 1 to the ABA Commission on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which is currently reviewing the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. 20s These amendments reflect the Code's important role in articulating the highest aspirational standards for our nation's courts. Canon
1 states:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing,
maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall
personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions
of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that
objective.2"
In section 4 of the Commentary to Canon 1, the text currently defines "a judiciary of integrity" as "one in which judges are known for
their probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character."2' 7
It further defines "an independent judiciary" as "one free of inappropriate
outside influences" and explains that "[p]ublic confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to this
responsibility.'2 ° I contend that the following language should be added
to this commentary:
Impartiality in the context of judges denotes an open mind
and the absence of bias in favor of, or against, individual parties
or classes of parties. An impartial judiciary is one in which
See Testimony of Sherrilyn A. Ifill before ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
205.
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/resources/commrules ifill_080604.pdf.
206.

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2000), available at http://

wwwabanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon
207.

l.html.

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcc/canon_
208.

Id.

.html.

cmt.

(2000), available at
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judges are selected by means that are fair and equitable and
that result in a qualified and diverse bench.
In my view, this description of impartiality addresses both the individual
and structural components of this important element of due process.209
2. Adopt Public Financing ofJudicial Elections
In addition, all states that hold judicial elections-retention or otherwise-should adopt a system of public financing for judicial elections.
There are few more urgently-needed reforms to the current method of
electing judges in most states than campaign finance reform. The need for
judicial candidates in most states to raise huge war chests to run for judicial office undermines both diversity and impartiality on the bench.
Skyrocketing campaign expenditures for judicial candidates are relatively
new. The mid-1980s saw the first and then-unprecedented one million
dollar supreme court judicial races." 0 Since then, money has arguably become the most accurate predictor of the outcome of supreme court
judicial races,21 and the cost ofjudicial races has risen
' 212 "as fast as that of...
Congressional races [and] presidential campaigns.
The effect of money in judicial races threatens judicial impartiality.
Major donors-principally businesses, corporations, and lawyers -may
regard candidate beneficiaries as "their" judges.1 4 More disturbingly, some
evidence suggests that campaign donations may affect judicial decisionmaking.21 The very essence of impartiality is compromised by a judge's
sense that she owes allegiance to a donor community. In any case, strong
evidence suggests that to a significant majority of the public, the

209.
The Code may be amended by the ABA to reflect changes inthe definition of
impartiality by the time this Article goes to print.
the 1990s:ABA Reviews Code, NAT'L L.J.,
Martha Middleton, BringingJudges into
210.
Feb. 22, 1988, at 1.
211.
See GOLDBERG & SANcisEz, supra note 50, at 15 (analyzing rising cost of state
supreme court races and concluding that "[w]ith few exceptions, money means victory"
for supreme court judicial candidates).
212.
Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION,Jan. 26,1998.
213.
See GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 50, at 17 (finding that according to a recent study "two-thirds of all donations to [state] Supreme Court candidates came from
lawyers and business interests").
See Lanny Keller,Judicial Campaigns Undermine Respect, ADVOCATE, Jan. 13, 2000,
214.
at 9.B.5.
215.
See T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A; 60 Minutes:JusticeforSale? (CBS News television broadcast, Nov. 1, 1998) (transcript available at Lexis, CBS News Transcripts); see also, James Gill,
Influencing Louisiana's Judiciary, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 3, 1999 (describing

claims that Lousiana Supreme Court justice Pascal Colgero succumbed to pressure from
corporate campaign donors).
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appearance of impartiality among judges has been severely compromised
by unfettered campaign donations from private donors.1 6
Moreover, the presence of big money in judicial campaigns compromises structural impartiality by undermining diversity on the bench.
Because blacks control fewer financial resources, they are less likely than
217
Ironically,
their white counterparts to make campaign contributions.
campaign finance "reforms" that lower caps on individual contributions
may work against black candidates who run in majority white jurisdictions and who may be able to obtain the financial support of one or two
wealthy contributors but lack the more broad-based financial support
among members of the bar enjoyed by white candidates. 2 8 This severely
disadvantages black candidates in majority white jurisdictions.
Judicial elections should be fully funded by public money. Some
219
states have adopted modified public financing schemes for judicial races.
States that choose to elect their judges should formally adopt a public
financing scheme that makes funds available to judicial candidates who
obtain enough signatures to suggest that they have significant electoral
support in the community. Television ads have become standard and essential forms of judicial campaigning in many states.22° Public money
should finance a limited number of candidate television commercials for
the highest judicial offices. Trial judges should receive money for travel,
campaign literature, signs, and radio ads. States should fund at least one
non-partisan judicial candidate forum, at which the public has an opportunity to meet and learn more about the candidates running for judicial
office.
More often than not, third-party interest groups are responsible for
airing the most misleading and nasty television ads in judicial races. The
216.
See, e.g., John Caher, Forum Explores Judicial Election Funding Reform, N.Y L.J.,
Dec. 8, 1999; Keller, supra note 214.
Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. RFv. 1469, 1474 (2001); see
217.
Spencer A. Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80
TEx. L. R-v. 987,1012-14 (2002).
218.
1 thank Laura W Murphy, Director of the Washington Legal Office of the
American Civil Liberties Union, for sharing this perspective with me. Ms. Murphy's father,
the Honorable William H. Murphy Sr., was one of the first elected black judges in Maryland.
Full public financing of judicial elections is currently only available in North
219.
Carolina. See Robert A. Stein, Standing UpforJudges:Committee Strives to Ensure Impartiality
in America's Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 67 (2003); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 163-278.61-70 (2003)
(taking effect with judicial elections in 2004); Wis. STAT. § 11.001-11.66 (2004) (enacted
in 1975). Texas limits contributions but does not finance elections. Thx. EiEc. CODE ANN.
S 253.155 (2003). Pending legislation in Illinois would finance supreme court judicial
campaigns, excluding retention elections. S.B. 1415, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2004), available
at http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). Pending legislation in
NewYork would provide optional public financing. S.B. A11457, N.Y. State Assem. (N.Y
2004), availableat http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A11457) (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
220.
See GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 50, at 7.
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vast majority of these ads eschew focusing on a candidate's qualifications
for office and are directed instead at suggesting how a judicial candidate
would decide a hot-button issue like abortion or the imposition of the
death penalty.2 2 ' It has been estimated that these interest groups spent
more than $2.2 million on television ads for judicial races in 2002.222 In
the state of Michigan, one interest group-the state Chamber of Com223
merce-"spent more on airtime than all the candidates combined.,
Third party individuals and interest groups have a right to political expression covered by the First Amendment. But as the Court's decision in
McConnell demonstrates, that right is not entirely unfettered. The state can
and should impose some restrictions on these ads, leveling penalties for
airing ads that recklessly misrepresent a candidate's record.
Judicial candidates should also be compelled to address ads aired on
their behalf. States should require at a minimum that judicial candidates
either endorse or disavow third-party ads supporting them. The candidate's endorsement or disavowal should be stated both at the beginning
and at the end of the advertisement. In other words, the onus should be
on judicial candidates to affirmatively separate themselves from advertisements aired on their behalf that threaten the appearance and reality of
impartiality by purporting to predict how a judicial candidate would decide legal issues if elected. The decision of a judicial candidate to ally
herself with advertisements that undermine the core value of judicial impartiality should constitute a valid ground, within the context of the
campaign, upon which to assert that candidate's unfitness for judicial office. The message may be driven home by the local and state bar
associations in their candidate review and endorsement process and by
local media in the preparation of their editorial endorsements prior to
election day."' Judicial campaign conduct committees, which have sprung
up in many states since the White decision, can and increasingly will play a
critical role in educating the public
about the boundaries of appropriate
225
conduct in judicial campaigns.

221.
Id.at 11-12.
222.
Id.at 11.
223.
Id.
224.
See, e.g., Georgina Gustin, Bar Association Asks Judicial Candidates to Pull Attack
Ads, ST.Louis POST-DSPATCH, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.sdtoday.com/sdtoday/
news/stories/nsf/election2004/story/829C1B5DEA33SE6786256.
225.
The National Center for State Courts convened an Ad Hoc Committee on
Judicial Campaign Conduct following the decision in White. Anne L. Keith,Judicial Election: NCSC Ad Hoc Committees, in NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 2002 REPORT ON TRENDs
IN THE STATE COURTS (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KISCtFutuTrends02 UpdatesPub.pdf. In 2004 the committee edited a manual to advise
state judicial campaign conduct committees on addressing the range of campaign conduct
issues that have arisen in judicial races since White. See NAT'L An Hoc ADVISORY Comm.
ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL
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3. Adopt Cumulative Voting
As states consider moving to a Missouri Plan system, they should
also consider the possibility of using cumulative voting for the election of
judges. Cumulative voting is an alternative voting method in which candidates continue to run "at-large" rather than by district, but voters may
cast as many votes as there are open seats. Thus if there are three judicial
seats available in a jurisdiction, each voter receives three votes. Voters may
cast all three votes for one candidate or may disperse one or more of their
votes among the available candidates. Corporations often use cumulative
voting to elect directors and to promote the interest of minority shareholders. It has also been used in Chilton County, Alabama;2 6 Sisseton,
South Dakota; 27 and Alamogordo, New Mexico 2s to enhance the ability
of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice to city councils and
school boards. 29
Because voters are free to cast more than one vote for a candidate,
cumulative voting enables voters to vote with greater passion and to vote
more strategically. Cumulative voting enables minority voters to elect
candidates of their choice to office in majority white jurisdictions, even in
the face of racially polarized voting.' Moreover, cumulative voting may
even be superior to a single-member district system in promoting racial
diversity on the bench. In a district system in which districts are either
majority white or majority black, the candidates of choice of black voters
will only run in majority black districts. Thus white voters who wish to
vote for black candidates who are also the candidates of choice of black
voters must live in majority black jurisdictions. By contrast, cumulative
voting promotes voting across racial lines, because voters are not placed
into majority black or majority white districts. White voters who wish to
A How-To HANDBOOK (2004), available at http://
www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/Handbook.pdf
Richard Engstrom et al, One Person, Seven Votes:The Cumulative Voting Experience
226.
in Chilton County, Alabama, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: SHAW v RENO
AND THE FUTURE OFVOTING RIGHTS 285-313 (Anthony Peacock ed., 1997).
227.
Richard Engstrom & Charles J. Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative
Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Sc. Q.,June 1991, at 388-93.
Richard Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution:
228.
The Case ofAlamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 469,469-97 (1989).
In several other cases, courts have rejected cumulative voting remedies for mi229.
nority vote dilution as extreme measures that are beyond the scope of a court's remedial
power. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin County Cornm'rs, 376 F3d 1260 (1 lth Cir. 2004); Cane
v.Worcester County, 874 F.Supp. 695, 698 (D. Md. 1995).
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
230.
REPRESENTrATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (describing how racial minorities can effectively elect
candidates of their choice using cumulative voting); see also Delbert A. Taebel et al., Alternative Electoral Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution, 11 HAMLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
19,25 (1990).
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support black candidates who are the candidates of choice of black voters
need not live in black neighborhoods or districts in order to vote for
those candidates. Politically cohesive but geographically disparate communities of black and Latino voters who wish to support minority
judicial candidates are likewise able to elect candidates of their choice by
using cumulative voting. In sum, cumulative voting systems more effectively express transracial political 23coalitions than do single-member
majority-minority electoral districts.
Cumulative voting may be ideally suited for judicial elections because judicial elections are low-salience elections, contests in which the
electorate generally knows very little about the candidates for office. For
example, a voter may know some, but not all, six judicial candidates running for office in a particular jurisdiction. Cumulative voting permits such
a voter to put all of her votes toward the one candidate she knows or split
her votes evenly between the two rather than vote blindly or straightticket for candidates about whom she has no information. In addition,
judicial candidates need not appeal to the entire electorate in order to be
elected. Each judicial candidate needs only a percentage of voters who are
knowledgeable and passionate about that particular candidate-and willing to give three or four of their six votes to that candidate. For minority
candidates running for office in a majority white jurisdiction, cumulative
voting may be a boon. Black voters can pool their votes for one or two
candidates, perhaps in coalition with like-minded whites, and find that
they are able to elect a candidate of their choice to the bench. Finally,
cumulative voting reduces the need for huge campaign war chests, as candidates need not knock on every door or campaign in every
neighborhood in a county.
Some argue that cumulative voting permits fringe candidates to be
elected. I suspect that this possibility has already increasingly become a
reality as third-party interest groups have taken over the rhetoric of judicial campaigns, promoting and bankrolling candidates who share their
often extreme views. Even in the absence of third-party interest groups,
many extreme judicial candidates have been elected to the bench over the
232
past twenty years.
Regardless, the abolition of Announce Clauses is
231.
GUINIEn, supra note 230.
232.
See, e.g., Ann LoLordo, Ten Commandments Play Campaign Role, BAT. SUN, June
6,2000, at 1A (describing the candidacy ofJudge Roy S. Moore for a seat on the Alabama
Supreme Court).Judge Moore, who infamously rose to Alabama's Supreme Court in large
part because of his battle to keep his own hand-carved wooden tablets containing the Ten
Commandments on the bench, began as an elected county circuit court judge. He later
won the election and served on the Alabama Supreme Court, where he ordered a monument of the Ten Commandments to be placed in the rotunda of the courthouse in
defiance of a federal court order. SeeJeffrey GettlemanJudge Suspended for Defying Court on
Ten Commandments, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2003, available at http://www.newyorktimes.
com/2003/08/23/national/23JUDG.html; see also Editorial,Judicial Minstrels, NEw OLEANS TnMEs-PIcAYUNE, Nov. 11, 2003 (criticizing a white Louisiana trial judge who wore
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likely to unleash a new wave of extremist candidates who will manipulate
the electorate by using inflammatory rhetoric and distorting the records
of their opponents without fear of retribution.
Cumulative voting may not be an appropriate method for electing
judges in every state. Jurisdictions should experiment with selection systems to determine what will best promote diversity and impartiality in
their particular states. These methods may vary from state to state depending on the geographic location of minority populations, the size of the
minority population, the willingness of white voters to support minority
candidates, the integration of the local bar, and the prominence of blacks
and other minorities in the mainstream bar and on state nominating
commissions.233 States should not be encouraged to participate in a uniform national system of selecting judges. Instead states should respond to
the uniquely local nature of the legal culture, the political reality, and the
demography of their respective jurisdictions in shaping their judicial selection systems.
4. Launch a Public Education Campaign
Finally and most importantly, the bar, the bench, and judicial activists should embark on an education campaign designed to inform the
public about the nature of the judicial function. Perhaps the only thing
more dangerous to a legitimate justice system than judges who have prejudged issues and cases is an electorate that expects its judges to have done
so. Thus the most important task facing states and public policy advocates
may be the struggle to educate the public about the ideal character of
judging. This education may be accomplished by the use of coordinated
opinion-editorials, informative voter guides, public service announcements, local cable and radio programming, and public school education.
Educating judges is also warranted in this regard. New judges should not
blackface, an orange jumpsuit, and shackles to a party);William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns
Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y TMMES, June 5, 2000 (describing landslide electoral
victory ofJudge Daniel Eismann to the Supreme Court of Idaho after he claimed "I can
prove scientifically ... that evolution has not and cannot occur"); Sherri Williams,Judicial
Reprimand Suggested, CLARION LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 21, 2002, at 2B (reporting on
complaint filed against a Mississippi judge who stated his belief that "gays and lesbians
should be put in some type of mental institute").
233.
See, e.g., Rick Bundrett, Nomination ProcessThwarts BlackJudicial Candidates,STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 24, 2004; Pamela Hamilton, Jackson: Election of Two White Men to
Bench a Step Backward, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 31, 2004 (describing R1ev. Jesse Jackson's recommendation that South Carolina abandon an appointive system for judges and
switch to contested elections after successive appointments of white judges to bench); see
also Kyle Wingfield, Associated Press, Senate to Consider Assigning Supreme Court Justices to
Districts, TUscALoosA NEws, Apr. 7, 2004 (describing bill in Alabama Senate that would

move from statewide election of Alabama Supreme Court justices to district-based election in part to "ensur[e] that black candidates have access to the state's highest court").

FALL

2004]

Through the Lens of Diversity

merely be educated about docket control and other administrative matters
but also be compelled to attend mandatory seminars on impartiality and
bias. Judicial candidates should be asked specific questions about their
openmindness and their understanding of what impartiality means as part
of any local bar association candidate review process.
Following the White decision, the National Center for State Courts
created an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Campaign Conduct,
which recently published a Handbook on Judicial Campaign Conduct.234
The Handbook advocates the development of state-based public education campaigns directed at both the public and at judges. The Handbook
also recommends that state campaign conduct committees monitor and
encourage appropriate judicial campaign conduct and criticize inappropriate campaign conduct. The recommendations in this Handbook are an
excellent starting place for state education efforts in this area.
CONCLUSION
If Republican Party of Minnesota v. White provokes the kind of robust
review of judicial selection and judicial decision-making that I argue is
long overdue, it may, despite its substantive deficiencies, prove to be an
important catalyst for change in how we conceive of and conduct judicial
elections. It is my hope that states will resist the more heavy-handed aspects of White and instead use the decision to begin a dialogue about
judging, diversity, and impartiality that will enrich state and federal judicial systems throughout the country.

234.

NAT'L AD Hoc ADvisoRy COMM. ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT, supra note

225. 1 served as a member of the National Center for State Courts' Ad Hoc Committee
on Judicial Campaign Conduct and participated in early deliberations around the creation

of this handbook.

